“Self-Ownership”: A Critique.

(1) Ownership is a relational concept that implies a relationship between the owner and the thing owned. Of course, the mere fact that a concept denotes a relationship does not exclude the possibility of self-referential relationships, e.g. a doctor treating himself, and that self-ownership is just an instance of that. But observe that the doctor does not treat himself qua doctor but qua patient. So that person is doctor in one respect and patient in another respect, and the relationship is between these two. Such, however, is not possible in the case of “self-ownership”. Between what aspects of man’s nature is there a relationship of ownership? Since ownership designates the right to sovereignly dispose of the owned, what in man owns what in him? The only possible answer that comes to my mind is: his mind owns his body. But this implies an invalid mind/body dichotomy. Therefore, “self-ownership” is an invalid concept. At best, it is a bad metaphor for the fact that human being are sovereign entities that direct their own course.

(2) This brings me to the second point: the purpose of this invalid concept. Usually, libertarians use the so-called “self-ownership axiom” as the foundation of their political philosophy (to the extent that they have one): Man is a self-owner, to deny this implies a self-contradiction (thus “axiom”), therefore his rights/his freedom may not be infringed. Observe however, that this kind of faulty reasoning is only made possible by the term “self-ownership” which actually package-deals two different ways in which you can talk about “freedom”. For the purpose of this discussion, I call the first “metaphysical freedom” and the second “political freedom”. What I mean by metaphysical freedom simply is free will. I have the freedom to act as I will, I direct my own course and actions by choice.

Now, how are these two distinct concepts package-dealt? Observe that ownership is a political concept, it denotes my right to dispose of the owned as I please. And to have this right respected is a significant precondition for political freedom. However, when libertarians talk about self-ownership, they more often than not refer to “metaphysical freedom”, and this is also where the notion of “self-ownership” as an axiom comes from. For free will is indeed axiomatic: you cannot deny it without committing a self-contradiction. But in labeling this kind of freedom “self-ownership”, libertarians blurr the distinction between metaphysical and political freedom and thus are able to assert that just because we have free will, we should be politically free. Which is a non sequitur. Just because we can direct our own actions by choice does not automatically mean that we have the right to do so. Such a right needs to be grounded philosophically in an account of human nature and ethics. By using the package-deal “self-ownership”, libertarians try to get around that.

US/German friendly fire?

At present there is an issue that interests me very much in a theoretical as well as practical respect. The German news magazin Spiegel Online reported on the case of Gholam Ghaus Z. who is a German citizen and presently in US captivity in Afghanistan. Z., who was on a visit to family members in Kabul, was arrested in Kabul while trying to buy a razor at a local US army grocery store. The fact that he was in possession of approximately 1000 Euro in different currencies and several phone cards led the US army to suspect that he could be a terrorist. However, according to the German government, several interrogations and checking of Z.’s life context in Germany did not lead to a confirmation of that suspicion. The US government on the other hand is only willing to release him if the German government is willing to establish a de facto 24 hour surveillance of Z., which the German government refuses to do on grounds that such a violation of Z.’s right to liberty were absolutely unwarranted without any evidence or indication of his being a terrorist.

Now, what interests me, is the question: How is this conflict amongst otherwise friendly governments to be resolved? Of course, it is the legitimate purpose of the US government to protect the rights and security of its own citizens. But the German government has the same purpose. Obviously, the main problem is the different assessment of the case of Z. in the eyes of the German and the US government.

From the point of view of the German government, the US government illegitimately holds captive one of its citizens. What then is the German government morally obliged to do if the US government is not willing to release the German citizen? By what means can this conflict between otherwise friendly governments resolved in case that a common assessment of Z.’s case will not be achieved?

And more generally: By what means are possibly fatal errors of knowledge leading to conflict in the dealings of two (more or less) free and sovereign nations to be avoided and dealt with?

I would be intrigued to hear your answers.