Posts Tagged life

Emergencies and Range of Tolerance

I find it quite interesting to try to understand what an emergency situation is by means of a biological approach. In German, there is a word called “Toleranzbereich”. I do not know what the technical term is in English, but it could be roughly translated as “range of tolerance”. This concept denotes the physical or environmental circumstances in which an organism, given its particular physiological and psychological needs and its particular capacities for fulfilling these needs, is able to function and thrive. For example, a fish, by its nature, needs to live in water. It cannot survive on land because it does not have the capacities to adapt itself to the conditions on land so that it can still fulfill its needs. Man, too, is an organism with a specific range of tolerance. His environment must be structured in a specific way for him to be able to function properly.

An emergency is a situation where the conditions under which an organism, e.g. man, can live and flourish are no longer the case. Therefore, I would argue that what an emergency is can be best understand by reference to the concept of “range of tolerance”: Everything that falls into this range of tolerance are an organism’s normal conditions of living; everything that falls outside of this range would constitute an emergency.

The interesting thing about man is that he has the power to reshape the world according to his needs, i.e. he has the power to bring the world/his environment into his specific range of tolerance. However, this also means that he can do the opposite: He can reshape the world so that it will be inimical to his needs, that it falls outside of his range of tolerance. Man can create “artificial” emergencies, such as totalitarian dictatorships or wars.

The primary purpose of the science of ethics is to define principles according to which the volitional being “man” has to use his capacities for action in order to satisfy his needs under normal conditions, because he, by definition, is unable to survive (at least in the long-range) under any other circumstances. This is (1) why ethical guidance in emerency situations is difficult, if not outright impossible, because man’s capacities for action are wholly inadequate for such situations, and (2) why the only proper ethical principle applicable in an emergency situation is: restore normal conditions, i.e. do everything to return into your specific range of tolerance, as soon as possible.

It is, as a concluding sidenote, pretty interesting that man’s mode of life/survival — a mode of life/survival is an organism’s application of its specific capacities for action to satisfying its specific physiological and psychological needs — includes the expansion of the actual existence (or prevalence) of the normal conditions of his survival. Which means: Reshaping his environment so that it falls into his specific range of tolerance is not something man somehow does along the way, as a secondary issue besides surviving, but it forms a core part of his specific mode of life.

It must be added, however, that this is a relatevely new approach for me; and thus my position is still preliminary. There is still some thinking to do, e.g. concerning the status of things like heart-attacks which, too, pose an emergency to the organism, but arguably not due to environmental or outside circumstances where the organism’s capacities for satisfying its needs prove inadequate, but rather because the organism loses some of these capacities and therefore can no longer satisfy its needs/pursue its specific mode of life.


3 comments May 3, 2008

On Fear of Death

Many people are afraid of dying, not only when their life and health actually are under serious threat, but in general: Their fear is due to the incertitude they experience when confronted with the question:

“How will it be like, how will it feel to be dead?”

Most people don’t believe in an afterlife anymore (and they are right). Still, they are plagued by a certain kind of disquietude when they ask themselves what will happen to them and their bodies after their death, how it will be like when consciousness ends and the body decomposes, whether it will be like sleeping without dreams, or whatever. They cannot imagine the world going on without them, and without them being aware of it. They shrink away from the idea that they might be consigned to a black void, or however it might feel like. They feel uncertain and frightened, because they don’t know the answer to that probing question: “How will it be like to be dead?”–a question that actually can never be answered due to reasons I am going to expose later on in this post.

I think that Ayn Rand gave a good solution to the issue of fear of death as expressed in her well-known statement: “It’s not I who will die, it’s the world that will end.” This statement expresses a fundamental truth and gives an important hint to the origin of that unpleasant emotion connected with fear of death.

But what kind of truth? Obviously, the truth of Ayn Rand’s statement cannot be of a metaphysical nature, since that would contradict the primacy of existence: If reality exists independently from consciousness, then the withering away of my consciousness won’t put an end to existence.

I think that the truth conveyed by Rand’s statement is a basic epistemological truth:

There is no “what” of cognition without a “how” of cognition; no content of cognition without an instrument of cognition. Without consciousness, there exists nothing you could be consciouss of. If I die, i.e. if my consciousness ends, then the world, too, will end for me. And this also means that, for me, there will be no such thing as death or a state of being dead. As Ayn Rand remarked: Per definitionem, I won’t be there when it happens. One cannot live to see death.

The question of how death will be like is not only unanswerable–it is invalid. And it is unanswerable precisely because it is invalid. The mistake involved consists of assuming or projecting a “what” of cognition–the state of death–although there won’t be a “how” of cognition left in that state. Since there is no content of cognition possible outside of conscious awareness, asking for the quality of awareness of a non-conscious state is a vain endeavor.

Specifically, the mistake consists in the reification of the content of cognition as being independent from the instrument of cognition. This is an instance of disregard for the fact that objectivity always is a certain kind of relationship between existence and consciousness for which both sides are equally constitutive. In this case, both the “how” and the “what” are constitutive for the cognitive act. If you take away the “how”, there won’t be a “what” left, either. (Please remember that I am talking about the epistemological level; of course the withering away of consciousness does not put an end to existence. It merely puts an end to our access to existence, to our personal perspective on existence, to our sense that something exists, i.e. it puts an end to us.)

Thus, the mistake involved is a manifestation of intrinsicism.

What, then, would be a proper attitude towards death?

Our awareness of reality and of ourselves is conditionally based on the existence of our consciousness–an existence limited in time. Beyond that range of time, there exists nothing for us. We are dependend upon our consciousness, its range and cognitive capacity. That which is outside of its boundaries set by its eventual end is of no concern to us. This also applies to death. I won’t live to see death, that state in which my consciousness has finally ended. For me, who exists primarily through his conscious awareness, death is inexistent, for there cannot be an awareness of death per definitionem. And more: Death is not only inexistent by the standard of conscious awareness–it is also insignificant.

It is a moot point to reflect upon the quality of the state of death, for death does not have such a quality for us. My death is real only for those who are not me, because they will be confronted with my corpse–I won’t be. Therefore, instead of wasting time thinking about death, we should concern ourselves with life. We should reflect on how we should live and what we want from life. We will never live to see death; however, we experience life all the time. Epistemologically, for us there exists only our own life, and nothing else, neither prior to it, nor after it.

Life is what really matters, and what deserves our fullest attention. The proper attitude towards death, thus, is in truth the proper attitude towards life.


6 comments July 8, 2007


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