In my last post on the subject, I wrote that polemic was a stylistic device that consists in overstating an argument or opinion for the purpose of making a point, etc.

I need to correct this.

Some days after I wrote it, I per chance stumbled upon wikipedia’s definition of “polemic” which seems to be shared by a lot of online dictionaries or encyclopedias. This definition construes a polemic to be a specific type of text, rather than a stylistic device. From this point of view, a polemic is a text that argues against or attacks an opponent’s arguments or position on an issue with the aim of refuting it. The opposite type of text, i.e. a text defending a certain position, is called an apologia.

I would object to this definition of the term on the ground that I believe it to be a pars pro toto. If you look at the way people use the concepts of polemic or apologia, you will find that there are certain connotations involved. Rather than generally designating all texts that aim at refuting an opponent’s point of view, “polemic” refers to texts that try to do this in a certain manner. Observe that, when you are in an argument, people sometimes will exclaim: “Oh, this is far too polemical!”, implying that your previous argument was “one-sided”, i.e. it did not take into account all the relevant facts and had an “emotionalistic” undertone. The same is true of the concept of apologia, since an apologist is not merely a person who defends a particular point of view, but a person who does so “one-sidedly”, i.e. by being unjust and/or dishonest in regard to his opponent’s arguments.

A polemic, therefore, is not per se a text aiming at the rebuttal of an opponent’s point of view. Observe that there are also texts written for the same purpose in a dry and factual manner. And often, esp. in (German) academia, polemic is regarded as unsound or unscientific. The scientist, it is said, has to be fact-oriented and therefore unemotional–which is reflected very much in the unendurably dry treatises of some academics.

If “polemic” does not designate a certain type of text, what then? It clearly is not a stylistic device, as I had stated earlier. If it were a stylistic device, one would be able to point to some part of the text and say: “This is polemic.” But observe that there is no distinctive stylistic device called “polemic”, a device that could be pinned down in textbooks and learned by short sentence examples, as is possible with other stylistic devices. Instead, if one asks what is specifically polemic about a given text, one will find it necessary to point to such things as the use of sarcasm, etc.–which are stylistic devices of their own!

Now, the specific use of stylistic devices constitutes what is called a style, i.e. a characteristic manner or mode of executing one’s writing purpose. It therefore seems reasonable to classify “polemic” not as a stylistic device, but as a specific style of writing.

To paraphrase my definition at the beginning of the post: Polemic is a style of writing that consists in overstating an argument or opinion for the purpose of making a point in the rebuttal of an opponent’s point of view. To make a point is to emphazise or highlight that which is essential to the issues at stake, leaving all factors of lesser importance aside. And this “highlighting” is achieved by employing certain stylistic devices, such as sarcasm, or the arousal of emotions. A polemical text is a text that argues in terms of essentials and does so aggressively and with passion.

This is the reason why a polemical style is regarded as being “unscientific”: It has an emotional appeal, instead of merely giving the “dry facts”–which allegedly is the way reason would have it. Clearly, this artificial dichotomy of “polemic vs. scientifically sound” is just another variation on a well known dichotomy: the reason/emotion dichotomy. Since reason and passion are seen as two distinctive and diametrically opposed things, an argumentative text that at the same time has an emotional appeal to its readers is disqualified by the standards of unemotional “reason”.

In the mind of a person who accepts this distortion of the reason/emotion relationship and then goes on to choose the side of what he thinks to be reason, the difference between (legitimate) “emotional appeal” and the fallacy of “appeal to emotions” is obliterated. Such a person believes that an argument brought forward with passion is nothing but an emotionalistic “argument”, i.e. a claim not based on fact, but on whim–and accordingly he views an unemotional, dry style of writing as the hallmark of the scientific.

But since there is no dichotomy between reason and emotion, and since an argument brought forward passionately is not the same as an argument from passion, polemic is as valid a style of writing as mere factual analysis and argument. In fact, it is a much more powerful way of arguing–if it is done properly. Polemic is not only more powerful, it is also more difficult. A polemic, in order to be good and convincing, must be rooted in facts. If it is not, if it looses its connection to the factual argument it should be based opon, then the emotional appeal the writer tries to evoke will inevitably turn into an emotionalistic bubble. This is what makes it so hard to be a good polemicist.

But, in my opinion, there are only few texts as entertaining and illuminating at the same time as are those done in the art of polemic.

Polemic is a stylistic device that consists in overstating an argument or opinion for the purpose of making a point. To make a point is to emphazise or highlight that which is essential to an issue from the perspective of a particular problem or the context in which it is treated.

Good polemic has a summarizing function. It draws upon a solid, fact-oriented argument that either is developed simultaneously or had been put forward beforehand, and tries to hightlight the argument’s essentials in such a way that the reader inevitably feels the inner urge to exclaim: “That is just so true!” Good polemic derives its effectiveness and credibility from the soundness of the argument it is based upon, as well as it grants a special vigor to that argument.

Bad polemic misses its point. Either it highlights non-essentials and thus gives the impression of being out of place, or it does not sufficiently draw upon the underlying argument, or that argument is unconvincing or non-existent. Bad polemic is free floating and emotionalistic, whereas good polemic is rooted in facts. Since bad polemic actually consists of pointless overstatements, it gives the impression of being grotesque, laughably inflated and even embarrassing for its author.

Note: The following text was published first on my old blog in July of 2006. Since I still consider it to be good and true, I republish it here with only minor changes in wording which I did mostly for the purpose of clarity. I hope you enjoy it.

Due to the Soccer World Cup there has been a lot of talk going on here in Germany recently whether patriotism is a good thing and whether it is legitimate to feel “national pride”. Many people have been very enthusiastic about the new “Deutschlandgefuehl” (”Germany feeling”) and concluded that, finally, the Germans have found their way back to a “healthy” feeling of pride for their country and are no longer too much ashamed for being Germans.

But I certainly would not call patriotism that diffuse, alcohol drenched mob feeling displayed by many youths. I especially remember one instance: I was on my way into the city center when I met a group of primed boys flocking in the street and shouting: “Beat them to death! Beat them to death!” I don’t know whom they referred to–but certainly, this is not what patriotism is about.

This, of course, is an extreme example. In fact, most Germans enjoyed the world cup more or less drunken and peacefully, and I suspect that their “patriotism” had more to do with being fans of the German soccer team. Nonetheless, the German media, from left to right, mostly interpreted it all as Germany’s final return to patriotism. I think they only have a very vague idea what patriotism actually is, if any at all.

Patriotism commonly is understood as “love for the fatherland”. From this point of view patriotism mainly is an emotional disposition. It consists in feeling somehow “proud” of the country you live in. Tragically, most people today have no sufficient idea of their country’s history, ideological makeup, and other things that could lead one to be legitimately proud of it. Instead, their pride is a seemingly causeless sense of “belonging”. Ask people in the street why exactly they are proud of their country. If you can get any answer out of them at all, it will be insignificant. What these people don’t recognize is the fact that patriotism is not merely an emotional, but primarily an intellectual issue. It does not merely consist in feeling “good” about one’s country without giving reasons. One should know what is good about one’s country, and reversely, one also should know what is bad about it–and why. Since “good” and “bad” are value judgments, patriotism thus concerns itself with values, and especially–but not exclusively–with political values.

What is the nature of these values?

Observe, that men do not live in a vacuum. Usually, they live together in a society. While this clearly does not mean that they are the property of a collective, it certainly does not mean either that men live as scattered atoms completely unrelated to each other. Society is not a mere aggregation of individuals, but an integration. Several individuals are integrated into one society by means of a social order–specific cultural, economic and especially political institutions such as e.g. a common language, set of values or national “sense of life”, trade, a common currency, a common government and common laws, and many more that ensure a peaceful and cooperative coexistence of men.

(Please note that a social order conceptually is not quite the same as a social system. Whereas the concept “social system” in Ayn Rand’s definition refers to a set of “moral-political-economic principles [...] which determine the relationships, the terms of association, among the men living in a given geographical area”, the concept “social order” refers to the concrete institutions actually embodying these principles. And, in my opinion, one abstract principle can translate into several, but only slightly varying concrete institutions.)

But since man is a being of a specific nature, not every type of social order is beneficial to him, let alone able to maintain a stable and enduring society. If he creates institutions that embody principles which are contrary to his nature and the demands reality imposes on him, he will see his society slowly fragment, disintegrate and fall apart. If he advocates and puts into practice such doctrines as altruism, statism and dictatorship, his society consequently will break down in bloody warfare sooner or later. Remember that Germany, above all, went through such a nightmare.

Thus, the important thing is to advocate and put into practice the right principles, namely such as by their very nature, when translated into specific institutions, are capable of integrating individuals into a peaceful and cooperative society and of maintaining such an integration: e.g. rational egoism, capitalism and the rule of law, among others.

He, who advocates and strives to put into practice rational principles that work to keep integrated the society he chooses to live in, is a patriot. From this point of view patriotism is a certain attitude towards the social order, an attitude aiming at improving, replacing or abolishing bad institutions and defending good ones. It is a critical attitude and has nothing to do with the “my country right or wrong” approach of chauvinists, who regard as intrinsically good those institutions their society may just happen to have. Neither does it consist of arbitrarily imposing such principles upon one’s society as are conceived by one’s sheer whim. On the contrary, patriotism is about defending that which is objectively good about one’s society, and it is about criticizing and improving that which is objectively bad. Patriotism is value-orientedness in regards to the society one lives in.

Since virtue generally concerns the proper relationship of man to reality, one may classify patriotism as that specific virtue which concerns the proper relationship of the individual to that aspect of reality which is society. More specifically, patriotism is a constitutive part of the virtue of integrity; it is loyalty to rational moral-political-economic principles and the moral ambition to modify the social order of the society one chooses to live in according to these principles. Since men do not live together as unrelated atoms, he, who advocates and puts into practice such principles as are harmful and destructive to the society he lives in, will harm himself in the long run. Such a man does not display a great deal of integrity and has to be considered positively unpatriotic and immoral in proportion to the destructiveness and immorality of the principles he advocates.

What then is required in order to practice the virtue of patriotism?

First, it is necessary for every aspiring patriot to have a basic understanding of how a society works, what policies keep it together, and which destroy it. Every patriotic citizen should aim at acquiring a basic education in economics (i.e. how wealth is created on a free market by voluntary and mutual cooperation to mutual benefit, and how socialist and interventionist policies produce an institutionalized “cold civil war” ultimately leading to impoverishment and destruction), political philosophy (i.e. what rights are, what the nature and purpose of government is, and how its different branches work), moral philosophy (i.e. why human flourishing requires the recognition of individual rights, the practice of certain virtues and the rejection of mysticism, altruism, statism and other corrupt theories), and history (i.e. how specific ideas and principles worked in practice in the past, whether they resulted in human florishing or decay). Second, every aspiring patriot should keep himself informed, not about every occurrence, but about the general trends of development and most important issues his society is affected by. After having acquired such knowledge, recognized such trends and analyzed such issues, it is necessary for him to take action by speaking his mind and pronouncing judgment whenever it is necessary, i.e. whenever silence could be taken as agreement with or sanction of evil and destructive principles (for details, see Ayn Rand: “How Does One Lead a Rational Life in an Irrational Society?” in: The Virtue of Selfishness, Signet: New York 1984, pps.82-86). In this respect, it is very important to have a proper and just evaluation of major politicians, especially if they run for office in an election campaign, and then act accordingly (good examples of how to judge politicians are provided by Ayn Rand in: Ayn Rand Answers, ed. Robert Mayhew, New American Library: New York 2005, pps.58-71).

Of course, being a patriot requires courage, independence, justice, honesty and many more of man’s virtues. This is just another illustration of the fact that one cannot practice any one virtue as isolated from all the others. Indeed, such comportment would undermine the practice of all virtues. Thus, only a fully virtuous person can be a genuine patriot, and only a genuine patriot can be a fully virtuous person.

Many people are afraid of dying, not only when their life and health actually are under serious threat, but in general: Their fear is due to the incertitude they experience when confronted with the question:

“How will it be like, how will it feel to be dead?”

Most people don’t believe in an afterlife anymore (and they are right). Still, they are plagued by a certain kind of disquietude when they ask themselves what will happen to them and their bodies after their death, how it will be like when consciousness ends and the body decomposes, whether it will be like sleeping without dreams, or whatever. They cannot imagine the world going on without them, and without them being aware of it. They shrink away from the idea that they might be consigned to a black void, or however it might feel like. They feel uncertain and frightened, because they don’t know the answer to that probing question: “How will it be like to be dead?”–a question that actually can never be answered due to reasons I am going to expose later on in this post.

I think that Ayn Rand gave a good solution to the issue of fear of death as expressed in her well-known statement: “It’s not I who will die, it’s the world that will end.” This statement expresses a fundamental truth and gives an important hint to the origin of that unpleasant emotion connected with fear of death.

But what kind of truth? Obviously, the truth of Ayn Rand’s statement cannot be of a metaphysical nature, since that would contradict the primacy of existence: If reality exists independently from consciousness, then the withering away of my consciousness won’t put an end to existence.

I think that the truth conveyed by Rand’s statement is a basic epistemological truth:

There is no “what” of cognition without a “how” of cognition; no content of cognition without an instrument of cognition. Without consciousness, there exists nothing you could be consciouss of. If I die, i.e. if my consciousness ends, then the world, too, will end for me. And this also means that, for me, there will be no such thing as death or a state of being dead. As Ayn Rand remarked: Per definitionem, I won’t be there when it happens. One cannot live to see death.

The question of how death will be like is not only unanswerable–it is invalid. And it is unanswerable precisely because it is invalid. The mistake involved consists of assuming or projecting a “what” of cognition–the state of death–although there won’t be a “how” of cognition left in that state. Since there is no content of cognition possible outside of conscious awareness, asking for the quality of awareness of a non-conscious state is a vain endeavor.

Specifically, the mistake consists in the reification of the content of cognition as being independent from the instrument of cognition. This is an instance of disregard for the fact that objectivity always is a certain kind of relationship between existence and consciousness for which both sides are equally constitutive. In this case, both the “how” and the “what” are constitutive for the cognitive act. If you take away the “how”, there won’t be a “what” left, either. (Please remember that I am talking about the epistemological level; of course the withering away of consciousness does not put an end to existence. It merely puts an end to our access to existence, to our personal perspective on existence, to our sense that something exists, i.e. it puts an end to us.)

Thus, the mistake involved is a manifestation of intrinsicism.

What, then, would be a proper attitude towards death?

Our awareness of reality and of ourselves is conditionally based on the existence of our consciousness–an existence limited in time. Beyond that range of time, there exists nothing for us. We are dependend upon our consciousness, its range and cognitive capacity. That which is outside of its boundaries set by its eventual end is of no concern to us. This also applies to death. I won’t live to see death, that state in which my consciousness has finally ended. For me, who exists primarily through his conscious awareness, death is inexistent, for there cannot be an awareness of death per definitionem. And more: Death is not only inexistent by the standard of conscious awareness–it is also insignificant.

It is a moot point to reflect upon the quality of the state of death, for death does not have such a quality for us. My death is real only for those who are not me, because they will be confronted with my corpse–I won’t be. Therefore, instead of wasting time thinking about death, we should concern ourselves with life. We should reflect on how we should live and what we want from life. We will never live to see death; however, we experience life all the time. Epistemologically, for us there exists only our own life, and nothing else, neither prior to it, nor after it.

Life is what really matters, and what deserves our fullest attention. The proper attitude towards death, thus, is in truth the proper attitude towards life.

Usually around election time, politicians stir up a debate about people’s disenchantment with politics as manifested in low voter turnouts, a general frustration with politicians and, in its extreme form, a passive rejection of the entire political system. Politicians warn that such an attitude could, in the long run, threaten our democracy and our liberty. Since they identify its chief cause as an image problem of politics, millions of dollars are poured into financing campaigns to politicize the citizens and to lure the young into political activism.

Politicians are right to fear that people’s disenchantment with politics will threaten the nation’s political health, but instead of offering a real solution to the problem, they only administer more of the poison that caused it.

Disenchantment with politics is a typical illness of a “mixed economy”, of a society whose government massively intervenes into people’s life and the economy by establishing ever more taxes, controls and regulations—i.e. by replacing self-determination of one’s own life by “democratic co-determination”. To an increasing extent, how to best live your own life—whether it be issues of education, work or health care—is not decided by yourself alone, but by political institutions, committees and government officials, who are elected by you as well as by millions of others.

Since your vote is only one among millions, this minimizes your control over your own life, and does so increasingly the more areas of life are permeated by politics. On the other hand, what is strengthened is the government officials’—the politicians’—power since they are the ones making the decisions that determine vast areas of your life. Since not many people have the time, resources or even the wish to actively engage in the political process or become politicians themselves (and this, essentially, is the cure recommended by politicians!), they become dependent upon the will of some bureaucrat elected by their neighbors.

As with all “collective decision-making” of a mixed economy, political decisions will always involve some sort of compromising between pressure-groups—who are just another product of the mixed economy—and these compromises will leave many people greatly dissatisfied. Government officials seldom decide the way you want them to, and often they will decide against what you perceive to be your vital interests, in important fields like health care reform, economic policy or foreign and security policy.

If such experiences of your most important interests being defied repeat itself over and over, and combined with the impression that you as a single citizen cannot do much about it, there likely evolves a sense of powerlessness and frustration, as evidenced in such typical expressions as “politicians will do what they want anyways”. If you cannot, due to circumstances outside of your control, achieve your goal—to lead your life according to the judgements of your own mind—then you give up striving after it: you resign.

Disenchantment with politics is a form of resignation with the mixed economy’s political system. Those who do not have the political pull in the pressure group game of the mixed economy, those are the ones who likely will become disenchanted with politics and dismissive of the political system. Those are the ones looking out for an alternative promising to remedy their sense of powerlessness, be it a new and rational philosophy giving them guidance how to win back their political and personal self-determination—or a Fuehrer pledging to “clean up the political pigpen”.

The problem’s chief cause is not the bad image of politics—which actually is just another symptom, a corollary of a deeper cause: The chief cause of people’s disenchantment with politics is the increasing politicization of vast areas of their life, which is so characteristic to and inherent in the system of the mixed economy. This politicization—the shifting of decision-making powers pertaining to all important issues of our lives from private citizens to political bodies, including the whole ensuing pressure group warfare—massively curbs personal responsibility and independence, and thus creates a feeling of personal powerlessness—of permanent social crisis—that fosters political discontent and disorientation.

What do politicians offer as a solution? Expensive image campaigns aimed at fostering public support and political participation, as well as recruiting the young for the further politicization of life and society. These measures will not solve, but only aggravate the problem.

The solution is not more politics, not more collective decision-making, but a drastic de-politicization of society—a retreat of politics from our daily lives.

Nota Bene. I wrote this paper for my OAC Introduction to Writing Course, and it accordingly is the property of the OAC. I reproduce the paper here with permission. This, however, does not in any way imply an endorsement of the views expressed in the above paper by the OAC or the Ayn Rand Institute.

A hypochondriac is a person who is in constant fear for his health. He is always on the lookout for symptoms that might convey a major and probably deadly illness of his body, and often he is shaken with anxiety due to the slightest inanity. The hypochondriac’s fear-burdened relationship to his own bodily functioning is a strong obstacle to a happy and normal life.

What differentiates the hypochondriac from a normal man, who trusts his health and his body’s competence to function in a way appropriate to his survival, basically is an issue of methodology, of the basic epistemological approach to health and illness.

A normal man regards being healthy as the normal state of his body. He only questions it when he has sufficient reasons to do so, i.e. if he observes certain symptoms–such as pain, fever, discolorations of his skin/eyes, or whatever–that might indicate a bodily malfunctioning. He then acts accordingly and goes to see a doctor in order to get a diagnosis and the appropriate treatment.

The hypochondriac, on the other hand, does not regard health as the given, which should not be questioned without sufficient reasons. Rather, he doubts his health groundlessly. This seemingly arbitrary doubt originates from his (implicit) methodological approach: Instead of regarding health as the normal and the given, he accepts illness as the normal condition of man’s (or, at least, his own) life.

Nonetheless, the hypochondriac still values his life, and therefore his health–a value under constant threat according to his methodological premise that illness (i.e. bodily malfunctioning finally resulting in death) is the normal condition and epistemological starting point in issues of health. Thus his constant fear, and thus his feverish effort to constantly check his body’s functioning, i.e. to prove to himself, by trying to gather sufficient reasons for it, that he is healthy.

Since the human body is a pretty complex entity, and since it is generally impossible to prove the nonexistence of something–in this case: of malfunctioning–, the proof desired by the hypochondriac has to fail. The hypochondriac is trapped in a situation where he, due to his methodological premises, sees a constant threat to his values, i.e. health and life.

Now, is there any reason why man should accept health, and not illness, as the normal condition? — Yes, there is.

Living organisms are conditional. Their continued existence depends on specific actions and processes that have to be successfully performed in order for the organism to stay alive. If the organism fails, it will disintegrate and finally die. Health is the state of an organism successful at the task of survival, of an organism whose functioning is appropriate to its continued existence. Illness is the state of an organism that fails at this task, and that has begun the slow process of disintegration.

For an existing thing, existence (qua the thing it is) is its normal state. This is also true of living organisms. But since the existence of such organisms is conditional, their existence qua living organisms means nothing but their being healthy as their normal state. Illness is not the normal state of living organisms, but a pathological state ultimately leading to their destruction/death, i.e. to non-existence.

Since health is the normal state of living organismus (and among them, man) metaphysically, it is only sound also to adopt health as the starting point epistemologically, when dealing with issues concerning the organism’s (mal-)functioning.

A rational man regards his health as the given, which does not require any further proof. On the contrary, it is illness the existence of which requires proof. His approach to issues of bodily functioning is: “I will regard myself as being healthy unless proven otherwise.”

The hypochondriac, on the other hand, is irrational. He ignores the metaphysical nature of living organisms and inverses the methodological approach in issues of bodily functioning. His approach to such issues is: “I will regard myself as being ill unless proven otherwise.”

Thus, the hypochondriac provokes a clash between goals and the means to achieve them, between his values and his competence, between his desired health and his seemingly fragile body incapable of achieving it. What emerges (or is reinvoked), then, is a sense of constant, tragic struggle against a failing body that, ultimately, is incompetent to live.

Welcome to my new blog!

I havn’t been blogging for quite a while now. My former blog started to bore and frustrate me, because I didn’t know what to write about, I didn’t have the time, and I hated the spam. Additionally, I don’t share any longer some of the points expressed in my former entries, and since some of them really annoyed me, I stopped blogging.

But, well, I have reflected on my basic approach to blogging and have decided that it was time to give it another try. In future, I will be blogging primarily for my own interests, not as some sort of duty, but because it can be of value to me. Specifically, I am going to blog primarily on philosophic issues, and hope for some illuminating comments and discussions. This also is the reason why I changed my blog language from German to English, since there aren’t many people in Germany (yet?) who do philosophy from an Objectivist perspective. Besides, a little English writing practice wouldn’t be bad.

I don’t know yet how regularly I am going to blog. But well, we’ll see!